Limits
Tech-neutral ceiling vs model-bearing channels
| UN Cybercrime Convention family | Outer rings (security / rights / capacity) | |
|---|---|---|
| Primary job | Criminalise, investigate, cooperate, share e-evidence | Norms, rights, capacity, state behaviour |
| Tech posture | Tech-neutral offences and powers | Can name architectures, safeguards, or models explicitly |
| Entry cost | 40 Parties + 90 days for EIF; domestic ratification queues | Often written input / programme windows; no 40-Party gate |
| What a “model” can be | Implementing guidance inside LEA boxes | Doctrine, CBM language, rights test, training stack |
| Risk | Over-broad cooperation / rights critiques | Non-binding or slow norm sedimentation |
If the Cybercrime Convention’s neutrality is the blocker, do not wait on Art. 65 — inject into a ring that can print the model.